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DRED SCOTT AS A CENTRIST DECISION*
MARK A. GRABER**
Common claims that Dred Scott demonstrates how the judicial
tendency to follow principles to extreme conclusions inhibits
legislative bargaining are perverse. Close examination of American
constitutional politics during the 1850s reveals that the Taney Court
occupied the, -political center while the elected branches of
government were more prone to domination by sectional extremists.
The only sectional compromises moderates in the elected branches
of government .were able to secure were statutory provisions
facilitating judicial review of contested slavery issues. Dred Scott
was a consequence of these legislative bargains aimed at preserving
union. Initial results confirmed the wisdom of a judicial resolution.
The Civil War came about largely because extremists in the elected
branches of the national government. were able to undo the
accommodation secured by centrist Justices.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional commentators believe elected officials are far
more likely than Justices to accommodate rival political interests on
the most contested issues of the day. The Supreme Court, Earl
Warren declared, is not the place where one "take[s] half a loaf where
a whole loaf could not be obtained."' Armed with life tenure, Justices
may do what they believe is constitutionally right in circumstances
where elected officials must compromise. Herbert Wechsler
articulates this consensus belief when he declared that while
"principles are largely instrumental as they are employed in politics
... the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must
be genuinely principled."2 The Supreme Court, Henry Hart agrees,
"is predestined ... by the hard facts of its position in the structure of
American institutions to be a voice of reason, charged with the
creative human function of discerning afresh... durable principles of
constitutional law."
3
This judicial capacity to take uncompromising stands on principle
is both celebrated and criticized. Ronald Dworkin regards the
Supreme Court as a "forum of principle,"4 capable of infusing
American politics with an aspiration for justice. "While other
political institutions have pandered to the American people's baser
selves," Christopher Eisgruber writes, "the Court has frequently had
backbone enough to stand up for the people's values."5 Scholars who
call for a reduced judicial role fear that active judicial intervention in
the name of constitutional principle inhibits vital political
accommodations. Even when courts reach the "just result," Cass
Sunstein observes, judicial decisions declaring laws unconstitutional
may "hinder social deliberation, learning, compromise and moral
evolution over time."6  Some social science literature suggests
adjudication polarizes politics. Charles Franklin and Liane Kosaki
provide reasons for thinking legislative bargaining breaks down when
adjudication offers groups the possibility of realizing their cherished
1. CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 6 (1977).
2. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 14-15 (1959).
3. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart
of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959).
4. Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469,516-18 (1981).
5. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 210
(2001).
6. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 33 (1996).
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policies in pristine form.7 Judicial winners are less inclined to yield
after Supreme Court decisions declare their constitutional vision the
law of the land.8 Judicial losers suffer the indignity of what they
believe is the procedural insult of illegitimate judicial activism added
to their substantive policy injury.9
Dred Scott v. Sandford"° is Exhibit A for the view that the judicial
tendency to follow principles to extreme conclusions inhibits
legislative bargaining. Proponents of judicial restraint consistently
invoke that ruling to illustrate the dubious results they believe occur
whenever Justices attempt to settle those major policy disputes that in
our system should be resolved by the elected branches of
government. Justice Robert Jackson proffered the most frequently
cited instance of this institutional critique when he claimed that, by
declaring the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court foreclosed any "hope that American forbearance and
statesmanship would prove equal to finding some compromise
between the angry forces [ ... ] being aroused by the slave issue."11
Horrific consequences are commonly attributed to that judicial
intervention. Lino Graglia maintains, "the Dred Scott decision,... by
denying national political power to deal with the slavery issue,
seemed to make the Civil War inevitable."' 2  "Dred Scott helped
precipitate secession," Jenna Bednar and William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
agree, "[b]y discrediting a previous congressional compromise[;] ...
[by] destabiliz[ing] efforts to mediate the slavery and antislavery
states; [and] by forcing the slavery issue back to the top of the
national agenda ... [which] fractured the Democratic Party and
contributed to the election of Lincoln as president."' 3
7. Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S.
Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 768 (1989).
8. See id. at 767.
9. See id. at 768.
10. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
11. ROBERT HOUGHWOUT JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:
A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 327 (1941); see MARK E.
BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FAILURE 116-17 (1998).
12. Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1019, 1036 (1992); see LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET,
REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 3 (1996); Neal
Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 99
(1998); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 49.
13. Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path":
A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1480 (1995); see
James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 318 (1999) ("The [Dred Scott]
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These common claims are perverse. Close examination of
American constitutional politics during the 1850s, as Part II of this
Article suggests, demonstrates that the Taney Court occupied the
political center, while the elected branches of government were more
prone to domination by sectional extremists. 4 At a time when
southern fireeaters 15  and antislavery northerners were
overrepresented in the legislative and executive branches of the
national government, the federal judiciary was staffed by southern
unionists and northern doughfaces.16 Part III points out that the only
sectional compromises that moderate members of the elected
branches of government were able to secure were statutory provisions
facilitating judicial review of contested slavery issues. 7 Dred Scott
was a consequence of these legislative bargains aimed at preserving
union. Initial results confirmed the wisdom of a judicial resolution.
The Taney Court decision in the spring and summer of 1857 was
strengthening those political forces most committed to peaceably
preventing secession. The Civil War came about largely because
extremists in the elected branches of the national government were
able to undo the accommodation secured by centrist Justices.
Part IV explains how legislative extremism and judicial centrism
during the 1850s were rooted in the constitutional rules for staffing
the federal government. Abraham Lincoln could be elected President
in 1860 under the rules laid down in Article II of the Constitution, but
he probably could not have been successfully appointed to the
Supreme Court at that time had the slave states remained in the
Union under the rules laid down in Article III. The electoral college
and the constitutional requirement that national legislators be elected
locally facilitated sectionalism between southern and northern
politicians. Southern politicians running for national office competed
over who best protected slavery."8 Northern politicians after 1850
frequently competed over who could best prevent slavery from
decision triggered a political firestorm, hurt the prospects for a compromise solution, and
undermined the prestige of the Court.").
14. See infra notes 158-251 and accompanying text.
15. "Fireaters" were the most vociferous proponents of slavery and southern
nationalism in antebellum America. See Michael Kent Curtis, John A. Bingham and the
Story of American Liberty: The Lost Cause Meets the "Lost Clause," 36 AKRON L. REV.
617, 626-29 (2003).
16. "Doughface" was a term used for "a northern ally of the South." Paul Finkelman,
Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the Proslavery Constitution, 32
AKRON L. REV. 423, 463 n.218 (1999).
17. Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, §§ 8, 27, 10 Stat. 277, 280, 287 (repealed in part 1933);
Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, § 9 Stat. 453, 455-56 (repealed 1983).
18. See infra notes 163-64, 171-74 and accompanying text.
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expanding. 9  The constitutional process for selecting Justices
privileged national moderates. Federal Justices were appointed by
the president, who faced a more national electorate than national
legislators, and were confirmed by a Senate majority.20 Border states
during the 1850s had far more influence over who sat on the federal
bench than over who controlled the House of Representatives or
White House.
Finally, the Conclusion details how the same factors that fostered
judicial centrism and legislative extremism in antebellum America are
present in contemporary American politics. American electoral
politics is increasingly characterized by polarized parties and a federal
judiciary that adopts more moderate constitutional understandings.21
Political scientists regularly observe that "the parties generally are
becoming more cohesive, more partisan, more polarized, and moving
toward the ideological extremes. 22 A central theme of contemporary
legal commentary is "The Center Holds."23  Nevertheless,
constitutional theory continues to assume interest-driven legislators
will adopt more centrist positions than Justices who decide cases on
the basis of constitutional principle.24  By highlighting the
constitutional centrism of the Taney Court, this Article may better
help Americans recognize that contemporary judicial centrism is
deeply rooted in the structure of constitutional institutions and is not
a generational aberration.
I. DRED SCOTT AS POLITICAL EXTREMISM
Dred Scott is criticized on virtually every ground for which
judicial decisions are criticized. The Taney Court's ruling that freed
slaves were not American citizens and that slavery could not be
banned in American territories is savaged for deciding issues not
necessary to resolve the dispute before the Court,25 for failing to
19. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 201-17 and accompanying text.
21. See H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 21
CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 2-3).
22. Id.; see JON R. BOND & RICHARD FLEISHER, POLARIZED POLITICS: CONGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA 1-24 (2000).
23. JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE
REHNQUIST COURT 11-12 (1995); Ronald Dworkin, The Center Holds!, N.Y. REv.
BOOKS, Aug. 13, 1992, at 29; see THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME
COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 228-30 (2004).
24. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., THOMAS HART BENTON, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL EXAMINATION OF
THAT PART OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
DRED SCOTT CASE, WHICH DECLARES THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MISSOURI
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consider the original meaning of the Constitution,26 for remaining too
tethered to the original meaning of the Constitution,2 7 for failing to
adhere to the plain meaning of the Constitution,28 for woodenly
adhering to the plain meaning of the Constitution,29 and for ignoring
distinctive legal issues that Mrs. Harriett Scott might have raised.3" A
brief survey of the appropriate journals will no doubt reveal a
scholarly consensus that Taney's penmanship in Dred Scott is the
worst ever exhibited in a judicial opinion.
The most persistent criticism of Dred Scott is that judicial
institutions lack and should lack the power necessary to resolve those
controversies that divide the body politic. Don Fehrenbacher's
magisterial study of that case concludes, "[T]he Dred Scott decision
... remains the most striking instance of the Supreme Court's
attempting to play the role of deus ex machina in a setting of national
crisis."31  Robert McCloskey asserts, the Taney Court erred by
COMPROMISE ACT, AND THE SELF-EXTENSION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO
TERRITORIES, CARRYING SLAVERY ALONG WITH IT 10 (1857) (describing the
unnecessary dicta used by the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott decision); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 549 (2d ed. 1988) (same); see also HORACE
GRAY & JOHN LOWELL, A LEGAL REVIEW OF THE CASE OF DRED SCOTT, AS DECIDED
BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 11-12, 26 (1857), reprinted in THE
DRED SCOTT CASE: THREE VOLUMES IN ONE (1991) (claiming that the rulings on black
citizenship and slavery in the territories were both "obiter").
26. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 30 (1990) (stating that there is no constitutional provision that
could have been read to confer a right to own slaves); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 at 272
(1985) ("The variety of feeble, poorly developed, and unnecessary constitutional
arguments suggests ... a determination to reach a predetermined conclusion at any
price."); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 559 (1978) (describing Taney's distortion of law and
history); William W. Fisher III, The Defects of Dualism, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 955, 969 (1992)
(reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991)).
27. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 CONST.
COMMENT. 37, 47 (1993); see also SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF
JUDICIAL POWER (1993) (criticizing Dred Scott); Erwin Chemerinksy, The Price of Asking
the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX.
L. REV. 1207, 1249 n. 278 (1984) (discussing Taney's decision in Dred Scott); Paul
Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical
Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 390-91 (1989) (critiquing Taney's interpretation of the
constitutional text); Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American
Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449, 494-500 (1989) (discussing the replacement of
republican science with a narrow focus on the intent of the founders).
28. LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 193 (1991).
29. SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 12, at 180.
30. Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033,
1038 (1997).
31. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 5.
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"imagin[ing] that a flaming political issue could be quenched by
calling it a 'legal' issue and deciding it judicially. 3 2  "The great
fundamental decisions that determine the course of society," his
influential The American Supreme Court states, "must ultimately be
made by society itself."33 Contemporary commentators agree. Cass
Sunstein declares, "we should understand Dred Scott to suggest that
... the Supreme Court should avoid political thickets [and] ... leave
Great Questions to politics."34
These critics charge Dred Scott with two related flaws. Instead of
seeking a compromise position, the Supreme Court gave total victory
to southern extremists. Robert Burt condemns the Dred Scott
majority for making no effort to reach a result that might have
satisfied all reasonable persons in both the North and South: "[B]y
awarding total victory to one side and, concomitantly, by inflicting
total defeat on the other," he asserts, "the Northern whites who
opposed territorial slavery were effectively enslaved by their defeat at
the hands of Southern whites."35 Mark Brandon claims, "Dred Scott
gave proslavers in the South more than they might ever have dared
hope for."36  Other scholars insist that judicial compromise is
inevitably obstructed when Justices intervene in hot political
struggles. Legal rhetoric, in this view, is a poor means for securing
accommodation between rival interests. Alexander Bickel describes
Dred Scott as "a futile and misguided effort, by way of a legalism...,
to resolve the controversy over the spread of slavery."37 Taney "can
be faulted," Keith Whittington agrees, "for attempting to impose a
resolution on an issue best decided elsewhere."38  By resolving a
matter on (erroneous) constitutional principle, the Justices prevented
more centrist institutions for reaching a politically acceptable
32. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 63 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 2000); see also DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848-1861 at
292 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1976) (asserting that courts could not resolve the slavery
crisis).
33. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 32, at 60.
34. Cass R. Sunstein, Dred Scott and Its Legacy, in GREAT CASES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 66,66 (Robert P. George ed., 2000).
35. Robert A. Burt, What was Wrong with Dred Scott, What's Right about Brown, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1985).
36. BRANDON, supra note 11, at 116.
37. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 36-37 (1975); see also
ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 193 (1992) (claiming that "inflated
expectations ... led the Court to issue blustering commands that only provoked
heightened disobedience and ignited more violence").
38. Keith E. Whittington, The Road Not Taken: Dred Scott, Judicial Authority, and
Political Questions, 63 J. POL. 365, 389 (2001).
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compromise. Eskridge regards the case as a "melodramatic example"
of how judicial efforts to resolve national issues "undermine[] the
ability of the political system to achieve a compromised
equilibrium."39 Louis Michael Seidman declares that the "ill-
conceived effort to settle the slavery issue in Dred Scott" is an
"important historical example[] of how the effort to entrench a
settlement can itself be destabilizing.
40
Remarkably, no critic who condemns Dred Scott for inhibiting
political compromise provides an alternative policy prescription for
preserving the sectional peace. Many commentators insist the Civil
War was inevitable.41 If so, neither elected officials nor unelected
Justices had the capacity to forestall secession. Other commentators
emphasize how the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the fight over the
Lecompton Constitution42 destabilized the antebellum constitutional
order.43 Such analyses suggest that decisions made by elected officials
were at least as responsible for inhibiting compromise as decisions
made by Justices. If so, then the Taney Court behaved no worse than
any other antebellum governing institution. Much evidence suggests
that Dred Scott had broader bisectional support and a greater
stabilizing impact on American politics than any legislative or
executive decision made during the tumultuous 1850s. Dred Scott is
better criticized, if subject to criticism, for the accommodation
antebellum politicians would accept than the alleged judicial failure
to accommodate antebellum politicians.
39. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Law From the Bottom Up, 97 W. VA. L. REV.
141, 166 (1994); see also Sunstein, supra note 34, at 76 ("[lit is ludicrous to suppose that
nine lawyers in Washington could lay this issue to rest by appeal to the Constitution. It is
hubristic for nine lawyers charged with interpreting the Constitution to think they know
the right answer for the nation as a whole.").
40. Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW'96 (2001).
41. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. MORRISON, SLAVERY AND THE AMERICAN WEST: THE
ECLIPSE OF MANIFEST DESTINY AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 251 (1997)
(quoting a Richmond newspaper as denying the election of Lincoln as placing the federal
government "in the hands of avowed enemies of one entire section"); KENNETH MILTON
STAMPP, AND THE WAR CAME: THE NORTH AND THE SECESSION CRISIS, 1860-1861 at
vii (1950).
42. For a discussion of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and Lecompton Constitution, see
infra notes 107-12.
43. See TYLER ANBINDER, NATIVISM AND SLAVERY: THE NORTHERN KNOW
NOTHINGS AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1850'S at 18 (1992); see also WILLIAM E. GIENAPP,
ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852-1856 at. 16-19 (1987) (discussing the




Dred Scott did not "award[] total victory" to the South and
"inflict total defeat" on the North." The Taney Court decision was a
far greater victory for the centrist Democratic party than for those
southern extremists who regarded the reigning Jacksonian majority as
insufficiently mindful of slavery interests." The judicial ruling that
freed slaves and their descendants could not become American
citizens was celebrated by most politicians in the free and slave
states.' The judicial ruling that slavery could not be banned in
American territories enjoyed near unanimous support throughout the
South and was endorsed by most prominent northern Democrats.47
Dred Scott was certainly not "more than" southern extremists "might
ever have dared hope for."'  Many southerners believed slavery
would survive only if Congress revived the international slave trade
or acquired additional southern territories.49 The right to bring slaves
into northern territories thought inhospitable to slavery was
considered more a point of honor than a political necessity.50
Dred Scott held that the policies favored by the national
Jacksonian coalition were constitutionally correct. "[O]ne full year
before the Dred Scott decision," Fehrenbacher points out, "its most
important conclusion had already been reached by Democratic
leaders of both sections."51 The slavery and citizenship prongs of the
Taney Court's ruling were anticipated in the middle 1850s by opinions
issued by the Attorney General of the United States.52 The Taney
Court's conclusion that Congress could not ban slavery in the
territories mirrored the victorious Democratic Party's platform of
1856.11 Both President Buchanan and his Attorney General,
Jeremiah Black, vigorously endorsed the most southern
understanding of Dred Scott, one that required territories to take
44. Burt, supra note 35, at 19-20.
45. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
48. See BRANDON, supra note 11, at 16.
49. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
51. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 196.
52. Caleb Cushing, Eminent Domain of the States-Equality of the States, 7 Op. Atty.
Gen. 571 (1855) (discussing the unconstitutionality of the Missouri Compromise); Caleb
Cushing, Right of Expatriation, 8 Op. Atty. Gen. 139 (1856) (discussing a citizen's right to
voluntary expatriation).
53. Democratic Platform of 1856, in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1956 at
23,25 (Kirk Harold Porter & Donald Bruce Johnson eds., 1956).
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affirmative steps to protect slave holdings.54
Antislavery advocates ruefully admitted that Dred Scott
announced principles that had broad national support. "Judge
Taney's decision, infamous as it is," Susan B. Anthony acknowledged,
"is but the reflection of the spirit and practice of the American
people, North as well as South. 5 5 Republicans on the campaign trail
consistently tied the Taney Court to the reigning Democratic
electoral majority.56 Lincoln in his debates with Douglas charged that
the Supreme Court's ruling was the product of a conspiracy between
Jacksonian presidents, Jacksonians in the elected branch of
government, and Jacksonians on the federal bench.57 He regarded
the Taney Court as merely following the most recent voting returns.
"[Tihe Dred Scott decision," Lincoln observed, "would never have
been made in its present form if that party that made it had not been
sustained previously by the elections.
5 8
The Taney Court ruling on black citizenship captured the
dominant "herrenvolk egalitarianism" of the middle nineteenth
century.59 Slavery was local, but racism in antebellum America was
national. "[I]n the United States," Tocqueville observed, "the
prejudice which repels the Negroes seems to increase in proportion as
they are emancipated."6 Fehrenbacher declares, "[t]he Dred Scott
decision, as it applied to free Negroes, had a majoritarian ring that
transcended sectional lines."61 Equality, Jacksonians in both the free
and slave states agreed, was equality for white males. Persons of
color were regarded as biologically inferior, perhaps even a different
species.' "[A] national poll," Rogers Smith concurs, "would have
54. James Buchanan, Third Annual Message (Dec. 19, 1859), in 5 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 552, 554-55 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS]; see JEREMIAH BLACK, OBSERVATIONS ON
SENATOR DOUGLAS'S VIEWS OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AS EXPRESSED IN HARPER'S
MAGAZINE FOR SEPTEMBER, 1859 at 6 (1859).
55. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 430.
56. See infra note 57-58 and accompanying text.
57. 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 465
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
58. 3 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 232
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
59. See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
IN U.S. HISTORY 551, n.25 (1997); see also infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
60. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 360 (Phillips Bradley
ed., 1945).
61. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 430.
62. See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN
THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 134 (1996) (noting that Jefferson "accepted and repeated
absurdly unscientific and illogical arguments about the racial characteristics of blacks").
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shown that a majority of [white males] approved of the Dred Scott
decision and its racist vision of American citizenship. ,
63
Mainstream Republicans, who shared the racial prejudices of the
time, were reluctant to criticize Taney's ruling on black citizenship.
Abraham Lincoln during his debates with Stephen Douglas made
clear that he "never ha[d] complained especially of the Dred Scott
decision because if held that a negro could not be a citizen.""'
Lincoln opposed making free blacks citizens of Illinois.65 He had
previously condemned Van Buren Democrats for permitting limited
black suffrage in New York.66 William Seward, Lincoln's main party
rival for the presidential nomination in 1860, regarded members of
"[t]he African race" as "being incapable of ... assimilation and
absorption," to "be regarded as accidental, if not disturbing political
forces. 
6 7
Southerners vigorously supported the judicial decision that
slavery could not be banned in American territories, but they did not
regard Dred Scott as a panacea for the major threats to the slave
states. During the years before the Civil War, southern expansion
was the main goal of those committed to preserving southern political
power. "I want Cuba, ... Tamaulipas, Potosi, and one or two other
Mexican States," Senator Albert Brown of Mississippi thundered,
"and I want them all for the same reason-for the planting or
spreading of slavery."68 Jefferson Davis declared such acquisitions
were vital means for "increas[ing] the number of slaveholding
constituencies."69 Many southern extremists sought to revive the
international slave trade. "It takes people to make States,"
Alexander Stephens pointed out, "and it requires people of the
African race to make slave States."7 Judicial permission to bring
63. SMITH, supra note 59, at 271; see HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE
DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ISSUES IN THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES
380 (1959) ("The overwhelming opinion of white Americans before the Civil War was that
Negroes were not fit to exercise the privileges of citizenship."); LEON F. LITWACK,
NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 at vii-viii, 30-31
(1961).
64. 3 LINCOLN, supra note 58, at 298-99.
65. Id.
66. ROBERT WALTER JOHANNSEN, STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 78 (1973).
67. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., App. 261 (1850).
68. DON EDWARD FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN
ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY 127 (Ward
M. McAfee ed., 2001) (quoting Albert Brown); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 347
(1859).
69. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 68, at 131 (quoting Jefferson Davis).
70. HENRY CLEVELAND, ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 646
(1866).
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slaves into existing American territories was expected to do very little
for the expansion of slavery in practice. Many slaveholders thought
the remaining Northwest Territories inhospitable to their peculiar
institution.71 "The whole controversy over the Territories," cooler
heads began claiming, "related to an imaginary negro in an
impossible place."72
Many conservative northern politicians, perceiving stakes in the
debate over slavery in existing territories to be lower than most
antislavery advocates contended, regarded Dred Scott as a victory
against extremists rather as inflicting total defeat on their section.
Free state Jacksonian newspapers endorsed the judicial decision
giving slaveholders rights in the territories. The New Hampshire
Patriot declared, "resistance to that decision is ... resistance to the
constitution-to the government-to the Union itself."73  Other
northern Democrats hailed Dred Scott as a "political boon," that
"fully and completely vindicated and sustained the Democratic
party."74 Northern doughfaces were pleased that the Justices had "at
a single blow, shiver[ed] the anti-slavery platform of the late great
northern Republican party into atoms." The official newspaper of
the Buchanan administration celebrated the "salutary influence" of
the Taney Court's ruling, predicting that slavery would "cease to be a
dangerous element in our political contests."75
These northern reactions demonstrate that the Dred Scott
decision, if not perfectly centrist, was more than satisfactory to
political moderates in both the North and South. Overwhelming
majorities in both sections believed that former slaves should not be
treated as American citizens.76 The right to bring slavery into the
territories was central to the platform of the last remaining national
71. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 68, at 271.
72. 1 JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS: FROM LINCOLN TO
GARFIELD 272 (1884); see Earl M. Maltz, The Unlikely Hero of Dred Scott: Benjamin
Robbins Curtis and the Constitutional Law of Slavery, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1995, 2014-15
(1996) (noting that such northerners as Benjamin Curtis and Charles Francis Adams
similarly regarded slavery in the territories as a dead issue by 1860).
73. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 418 (quoting the N. H. PATRIOT 3, Mar. 18,
1857); see also SMITH, supra note 59, at 199 ("That decision briefly fulfilled the actual
dreams of most Democrats, who wanted a nation unequivocally committed to slavery,
white supremacy, and states' rights."); CHARLES WARREN, 2 THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 311-12 (1926) (quoting Democratic papers in the North that
were supportive of the decision).
74. MORRISON, supra note 41, at 193 (quoting NASHVILLE UNION & AM., Mar. 15,
1857).
75. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 419-20 (quoting the UNION WASH., Mar. 6,
11, 12,1857).
76. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
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party competing for political supremacy. The Taney Court ruling was
probably not quite consistent with the preferences of the median
voter in 1856 (popular sovereignty earns that honor). Nevertheless,
Dred Scott was certainly acceptable to enough northerners to ensure
continued rule by the bisectional majority necessary to preserve
union. The judicial decision was both an adequate compromise and a
product of the only successful compromises political moderates were
able to reach during the 1850s.
III. DRED SCOTT AS COMPROMISE
Dred Scott was the direct result of "the last great territorial
compromises of the antebellum era."77 Elected officials during the
1850s were able to reach political agreements on sectional issues only
when legislation included provisions facilitating judicial decisions on
the status of slavery in the territories.78 The actual decision the
Supreme Court reached proved a successful compromise until
Buchanan demanded that Kansas be admitted as a slave state.79 The
decisions most responsible for the Civil War, the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, the submission of the Lecompton
Constitution, and the demand that the 1860 Democratic national
convention endorse territorial slave codes, were all made without
judicial participation.
A. The Decision to Decide as Compromise
Dred Scott was "undertaken only upon explicit invitation of
Congress" and the President.8 ° Unable to reach agreements in
legislative and executive fora, prominent Jacksonians (and moderate
Whigs) in all regions of the country during the late 1840s and early
1850s publicly declared that the federal judiciary was the institution
responsible for determining the extent to which slavery could be
regulated in the territories.8' President James K. Polk, Stephen
Douglas, Jefferson Davis and Henry Clay were among the numerous
antebellum political leaders who urged Congress "to leave the
77. Whittington, supra note 38, at 378.
78. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
80. Wallace Mendelson, Dred Scott's Case-Reconsidered, 38 MINN. L. REV. 16, 16
(1953). For detailed accounts of legislative efforts to have the judiciary resolve contested
issues over slavery, see FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 152-208 and Mark A. Graber,
The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 35, 46-50 (1993).
81. See infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
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question of slavery or no slavery to be decided by the only competent
authority that can definitely settle it forever, the authority of the
Supreme Court. '8 2  President-elect James Buchanan's inaugural
address in 1857 declared that the status of slavery in the territories
was "a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme
Court of the United States."83  Lest jurisdictional problems bar
judicial review, Congress after the Mexican War routinely inserted
measures facilitating judicial action on any question concerning the
status of slavery in the territories. 4 Dissenting voices were limited to
abolitionists and antislavery advocates, who correctly predicted that
the southern dominated judiciary would hand down decisions
consistent with southern understandings of slavery and race.8
Northern Democrats, the alleged "victims"86 of Dred Scott,
applauded the Taney Court's decision to issue a broad ruling. "If the
case had been disposed of in that way [on narrow grounds]," Stephen
Douglas declared three months after the judicial decision had been
handed down, "who can doubt ... the character of the denunciations
which would have been hurled upon the devoted heads of those
illustrious judges, with much more plausibility and show of fairness
than they are now for having decided the case ... upon its merits?"87
82. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1 Sess. 1155 (1850) (speech of Sen. Henry Clay); see
James K. Polk, Fourth Annual Message, 4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 54, at 642;
CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1 Sess. App. 154 (1850) (speech of Sen. Jefferson Davis);
CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1 Sess. App. 797 (1856) (speech of Sen. Steven Douglas); see
also CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1 Sess. App. 232 (1854) (speech of Sen. Andrew P.
Butler) (asserting that he had originally intended not to take part in this debate); CONG.
GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1 Sess. App. 95 (1850) (speech of Sen. Samuel Phelps) (stating that
the Supreme Court provides a "peaceful tribunal" to solve these types of controversies).
Leading Know-Nothings also insisted that the federal judiciary could best resolve conflicts
over slavery. See ANBINDER, supra note 43, at 207. Even Abraham Lincoln may have
claimed that the "Supreme Court of the United States is the tribunal to decide such
questions." 2 LINCOLN, supra note 57, at 355.
83. James Buchanan, Inaugural Address, in 5 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 54,
at 431.
84. See Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, §§ 8, 27, 10 Stat. 277, 280, 287 (repealed in part
1933) (enacting identical provisions for the territories of Nebraska and Kansas once again
giving the United States Supreme Court jurisdiction over all cases involving title to slaves);
Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 49, § 10, 9 Stat. 446, 449-50 (repealed in part 1933) (establishing a
judiciary for the territory of New Mexico and directing that all cases involving title to
slaves be decided by the United States Supreme Court regardless of the amount in
controversy); Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, § 9, 9 Stat. 453, 455-56 (repealed in part 1933)
(directing that all cases involving title to slaves in the territory of Utah be decided by the
United States Supreme Court).
85. See 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-1864 at 567-70, 591 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1974).
86. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OFTHE SUPREME COURT 124 (1993).
87. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting REMARKS OF THE HON. STEPHEN A.
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Douglas and other free state Jacksonians never criticized Dred Scott
for "aligning the judiciary with the pro-slavery forces.""8 That charge
was made by Abraham Lincoln and other Republicans, the national
minority in 1857,89 and was done so to persuade northerners that free
state Democrats were in the thralls of the slavepower. Northern
Jacksonians wanted the Court to decide Dred Scott, endorsed the
resulting judicial decision, and continued calling for judicial decisions
on the most controversial issues of the day.9" After Lecompton
supposedly made clear that Dred Scott undermined popular
sovereignty,91 northern Jacksonians overwhelmingly supported a
resolution that the Supreme Court determine whether the federal
government was constitutionally obligated to establish slave codes in
the territories.92
B. Dred Scott as a Compromise
The Supreme Court responded to legislative compromises
foisting responsibility for sectional issues on that tribunal by reaching
a sectionally satisfactory accommodation. Judicial rulings recognizing
a constitutional right to bring slaves into the territories enjoyed
enough support to maintain the antebellum constitutional order.
Dred Scott did aggravate some tensions responsible for the Civil
War.93 Antislavery advocates in the North were outraged by what
they feared was a conspiracy to make slavery a national institution.94
DOUGLAS ON KANSAS, UTAH, AND THE DRED SCOTT DECISION 6 (1857)).
88. Whittington, supra note 38, at 389.
89. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (explaining Dred Scott in terms of
electoral politics and observing that Stephen Douglas and the Democrats felt obliged to
honor the Dred Scott decision while simultaneously adopting policies that flew in the face
of other pronouncements by the Court).
90. See supra notes 80-83; infra note 92 and accompanying text.
91. See Whittington, supra note 38, at 379-80, 388-89.
92. STEPHEN DOUGLAS, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN THE TERRITORIES, JUDGE
DOUGLAS IN REPLY TO JUDGE BLACK 5-7, 20 (1859); see also FEHRENBACHER, supra
note 26, at 517, 534, 537-38.
93. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 562 (noting that Dred Scott "contributed
heavily to the general accumulation of sectional animosity that made some kind of
national crisis increasingly difficult to avoid."); POTTER, supra note 32, at 291.
94. See 2 LINCOLN, supra note 57, at 452-53, 461-67, 521-23, 525-26, 539-40, 550-53
("We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of
making their State free; and we shall awake to the reality, instead, that the Supreme Court
has made Illinois a slave State.") (emphasis omitted); 3 LINCOLN, supra note 58, at 78, 89-
90, 95, 99-101, 349, 368-69, 424-30, 443-44, 484, 548-50, 553; 4 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 28-29 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); THE
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 56-67, 82-85, 110-14, 229-34 (Robert W. Johannsen ed.,
1965); see also FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 437-38, 451-53, 457, 464, 487-88, 493
(noting Republican attacks on Dred Scott); ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE
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Southerners were offended by northern refusals to accept that judicial
ruling.95 Still, the historical evidence suggests that Dred Scott did not
further destabilize, and may have temporarily preserved, the
antebellum political regime. 6 The decisions most responsible for the
Civil War were made by those political actors whom institutionalist
dogma entrusts with the authority to reach compromises on divisive
political issues.
Compromise in 1857 meant an accommodation that enabled the
Democratic party to maintain its majority status.97 With the national
Jacksonian party gaining enough free state votes in 1856 to maintain
control over the national government, the Supreme Court in 1857
could forestall secession by decisions that lacked any appeal to
existing Republicans as long as those judicial decisions did not create
new Republicans. Given the fundamental differences in the
constitutional and political goals that divided northern Republicans
from Southern disunionists, no institution could have fashioned a
slavery compromise that would have satisfied all Americans (even if
persons of color are not counted as Americans).98  Southern
disunionists were actively weaning their electorate from that
Jacksonian coalition to pave the way for secession.99 Northern
Republicans were more interested in putting slavery on the road to
MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 97-98, 101
(1970) (same).
95. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 450, 562.
96. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
97. Disputes over slavery had already finished off the Whigs as a national political
party and prevented the Know-Nothings from developing any cross-sectional coalitions.
See ANBINDER, supra note 43, at 18, 100-01; POTTER, supra note 32, at 254.
98. Burt may insist that the Court must accommodate all parties to political
controversies, see supra notes 35 and 37 and accompanying text, but he does not explain
how this could have been done in 1857. Suggestions that the Court should have simply
kept the channels of debate over slavery open, Burt, supra note 35, at 19, beg the question.
One division between North and South was the extent to which antislavery agitation
should be suppressed or punished by the states and federal government. See Michael Kent
Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition
in 1835-37, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 785, 813-17 (1995); Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis
Over Hinton Helper's Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light
on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1113, 1131-33, 1151-59 (1993).
99. See 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT
BAY, 1776-1854, 4-5, 357, 490 (1990). For southern threats to secede if demands were not
met, see 4 JOHN C. CALHOUN, THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 576 (Richard K. Cralle
ed., 1854) ("[A]s things now stand, the Southern States cannot remain in the Union."); see
also FREEHLING, supra, at 316-19, 337-38, 479-86, 519-35 (describing the South's distaste
for compromise). Southern secessionists spent much of their efforts attempting to destroy
the Jacksonian coalition. See FREEHLING, supra, at 4-5 (describing the National
Democratic Party as the "Disunionists' foe").
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extinction than in preserving the union."°° Whether Dred Scott was a
reasonable compromise must be judged in light of that decision's
impact on the national party committed to a peaceful Union, and not
on reactions from partisans committed to either secession or a set of
policies that risked secession.
Dred Scott had no immediate baneful influence on the body
politic. "Taney's opinion," Kenneth Stampp's meticulous study of
American politics in 1857 concludes, "however provocative, produced
no concrete results."' ' Dred Scott did not weaken the capacity of the
Democratic Party to serve as the vehicle for statesmen interested in
compromising the slavery issue. The decision did not sap Democratic
strength in any region of the country or immediately increase enmity
between northern and southern Jacksonians. Fehrenbacher observes
that "reaction to the Dred Scott decision does not appear to have
produced any significant gains for the free Negro community or any
significant number of new adherents for the Republican party." 102
"The Republican attack on the case," Michael Morrison declares,
"had the effect of uniting the Democracy behind the Court. '0 3
Stephen Douglas made no enemies in the South when, during the
spring of 1857, he proclaimed that territories retained the practical
power to exclude slavery by not passing pro-slavery legislation."°
Jefferson Davis endorsed that view of territorial power over slavery
during that summer. Speaking in Maine, the future President of the
Confederacy declared:
If the inhabitants of any territory should refuse to enact such
laws and police regulations as would give security to their
property or to his, it would be rendered more or less valueless,
in proportion to the difficulty of holding it without such
protection.... [I]t would follow that the owner would be
practically debarred by the circumstances of the case, from
taking slave property into a territory where the sense of the
inhabitants was opposed to its introduction. So much for the
oft repeated fallacy of forcing slavery upon any community.105
Davis in the first half of 1857 favored new southern territories, not
100. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 479 (1850) (speech of Salmon
Chase); 3 LINCOLN, supra note 58, at 454-55, 502, 542-43 (speeches of Abraham Lincoln).
101. KENNETH M. STAMPP, AMERICA IN 1857: A NATION ON THE BRINK 109 (1990).
102. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 437.
103. MORRISON, supra note 41, at 189.
104. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 456-57.
105. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 499 (quoting Jefferson Davis).
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territorial slave codes for territories without slaves. °6
Voting returns suggest Dred Scott improved Democratic
electoral prospects in the North. Jacksonians had suffered massive
defections in the 1854 congressional and 1856 presidential elections as
a result of the Kansas-Nebraska Act.1"7 Democrats regained some
legislative seats in 1856 that had been lost in 1854. This legislative
trend continued in the immediate wake of Dred Scott. Northern
Democrats in state elections held during the spring and fall of 1857
"polled an increased percentage of the popular vote in every state
which held an election."'18 Major gains were made in Massachusetts,
New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Wisconsin.10 9 Fehrenbacher finds
"no evidence that Dred Scott manufactured votes for Republicans
anywhere." "[I]t is difficult," he concludes, "to escape the impression
that the decision, if it helped anyone, helped the Democrats."'110
The event that "brought on a genuine uprising of northern rank-
and-file Democrats" and ruined the party of accommodation was
President Buchanan's decision in the late fall of 1857 to demand that
Kansas be admitted as a slave state."' Led by Stephen Douglas,
northern Democrats who accepted the Dred Scott decision bitterly
attacked the fraudulent proslavery Lecompton Constitution. The
resulting struggle between the Buchanan administration and anti-
Lecompton Democrats destroyed the fragile union between northern
and southern Jacksonians, severely weakened Democratic party
strength in the North, and paved the way for Lincoln's victory in
1860.11 Dred Scott played a role in the destruction of the Democratic
party, but the role seems largely pretextual.
The bitter debates over Kansas inspired the Southern demand
106. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
107. See FONER, supra note 94, at 155-68 ("Taking the North as a whole, the ex-
Democratic portion of the Republican vote in 1856 may have been as much as 25
percent."); id. at 165; POTTER, supra note 32, at 239 (noting that the number of Northern
Democrats after 1854 dropped from 91 to 25).
108. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 565-66 (showing a "consistent pattern of
Democratic gains in 1857"); STAMPP, supra note 101, at 238. This rally may have begun
during the 1856 election when Northern Democrats regained almost half the congressional
seats lost in 1854. See POTrER, supra note 32, at 239.
109. See STAMPP, supra note 101, at 240-57.
110. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 566.
111. STAMPP, supra note 101, at 330; see FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 468, 563;
HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: 1835-1875 at 167-68 (1982); MORRISON, supra note
41, at 189-90; POTrER, supra note 32, at 393.
112. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 566 ("[Tithe Lecompton struggle was the
primary influence in the final triumph of Republicanism."); STAMPP, supra note 101, at
309-16, 322-24; 329-30.
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for territorial slave codes that caused the Jacksonian split at their
national convention in 1860.13 Before Douglas broke with the South
on Kansas, leading slave state spokespersons publicly agreed that
territories had no affirmative obligation to protect slavery.1 14 The
Buchanan Administration newspaper in the immediate wake of Dred
Scott described the Douglas position as "lucid ... vigorous ... and
powerful." '15  Southerners demanded a territorial slave code only
after Douglas refused to support the admission of Kansas as a slave
state, not after Douglas first declared that territories could effectively
exclude slavery by not passing a slave code.1 6 Fehrenbacher correctly
notes that while "[h]istorians have often said that the Freeport
doctrine made Douglas unacceptable in the South, ... it would be
more accurate to turn the statement around and say that Douglas
made the Freeport doctrine unacceptable in the South." '117 Douglas
did not improve his standing in the South by promising to support
slave codes when judicially obligated to do so.118 Southern rejection
of this proposal to have the judiciary mediate this section dispute,
given the likely favorable judicial decision, suggests slave state
hostility to Douglas in 1860 stemmed almost entirely from his
opposition to Lecompton, not from his interpretation of Dred Scott.
In sharp contrast to contemporary commentators who think
Dred Scott made compromise over slavery nearly impossible, many
Republicans living at that time thought that had Buchanan
compromised and allowed a fair election in Kansas on the Lecompton
Constitution, he and the Taney Court would have destroyed the
nascent Republican party, ensuring Democratic electoral hegemony
for the foreseeable future.1 9 Lincoln was quite concerned that
Republicans would support Douglas for the Senate in 1858, despite
the latter's defense of Dred Scott, as a reward for successfully
opposing the Buchanan administration on Lecompton. 20 Prominent
eastern Republicans were making significant overtures to Douglas in
1858. Lincoln used Dred Scott in the debates less to convert
Democrats into Republicans than to remind Republicans why
113. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
115. MORRISON, supra note 41, at 195.
116. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 500-13.
117. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 501.
118. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 1257-58 (1859).
119. See STAMPP, supra note 101, at 309-10.
120. See 2 LINCOLN, supra note 57, at 443-44, 446-51, 455-57, 459, 467-69, 497-98,
509-11.
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Douglas was unacceptable. 2'
The dramatically different impact Dred Scott and Lecompton
had on Democratic party unity confounds institutionalist assertions
that judicial review prevents elected officials from reaching socially
acceptable compromises on contentious political issues. The
decisions that destroyed the Jacksonian coalition and then the nation
were made by a Jacksonian president, Jacksonians in the national
legislature, and Jacksonian party activists, not by Jacksonian Justices.
Elected officials in the years immediately before the Civil War were
unable to reach any agreement securing national unity that did not
require eventual mediation by the Supreme Court. Left to their
devices, nonjudicial actors proved unable to compromise. The
destructive debates over Kansas took place entirely within the elected
and legislative branches of government. The destructive debates over
whether the Constitution obligated the federal government to pass
territorial slave codes took place in the Democratic senatorial caucus
and during the Democratic National Convention.
Judicial review provided the only possibility of compromise
before the Civil War. Elected officials passed the Compromise of
1850 and the Kansas-Nebraska Act after agreeing that the federal
judiciary should resolve contested constitutional issues. Eliminate
judicial review, and the compromises that maintained union in the
immediate wake of the Mexican War could not have been reached.
Northern and border state moderates most committed to maintaining
union continued to rely on the possibility of judicial review in 1860.
Prominent northern Democrats, Stephen Douglas assured the South,
would accept territorial slave codes should those measures be
explicitly mandated by a Supreme Court decision. Reverdy Johnson,
the conservative Maryland Democrat who successfully argued the
Dred Scott case, urged all party members "to acquiesce in the
judgment of that high tribunal, whatever that shall be.'' 22  The
Democratic party was destroyed when southerners demanded that
northern elected officials vote for territorial slave codes, and would
121. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 486-88; FONER, supra note 94, at 132;
JAFFA, supra note 63, at 10, 19-20; 3 LINCOLN, supra note 58, at 18-30; POTTER, supra
note 32, at 321, 331-35; Robert W. Johannsen, Introduction, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS
DEBATES, supra note 94, at 10. Lincoln continued to worry after the debates that
Republicans would support Douglas. See 3 LINCOLN, supra note 58, at 349, 366-69, 378-
79, 398, 433-35.
122. REVERDY JOHNSON, REMARKS ON POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AS MAINTAINED
AND DENIED RESPECTIVELY BY JUDGE DOUGLAS AND ATrORNEY-GENERAL BLACK
36-37 (1859); see Democratic Platform of 1860, in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-
1956, supra note 53, at 30-31.
1248 [Vol. 83
DRED SCOTT
not allow that dispute to be mediated by the federal judiciary.
IV. THE REASONS WHY
The Taney Court's capacity to help unite and strengthen centrist
political forces in the United States was rooted in the changing nature
of territorial issues and more permanent features of the federal
judiciary. Most members of the Taney Court did not consciously seek
the middle ground. Justice Grier and maybe Justice Nelson aside, 
1 3
no Justice seems to have abandoned his notion of constitutional right
in order to resolve slavery issues in the way most likely to
accommodate those political actors crucial to the continued
maintenance of the Union. The compromise lay partly in territorial
settlement patterns that made the central holding of Dred Scott
increasingly irrelevant to crucial free state voters, partly in the belief
that a judicial decision might gain more support than an identical
legislative decision, but mostly in the centrist character of the Justices
making the decision. Taney Court decisions on slavery issues
consistently appealed to sectional moderates largely because the
Taney Court was dominated by sectional moderates.
A. Slavery in the Territories
Support for judicial decisions protecting slavery in the territories
proved a concession free state Democrats could make to the South
without losing party strength in vital midwestern states. Jacksonians
during the 1850s attempted to preserve union by decoupling the
status of slavery in territories from the status of slavery in the states
formed out of those territories. Stephen Douglas defended this
political strategy by insisting that, contrary to inherited wisdom,
midwestern slave territories would not become midwestern slave
states. 124 As such, northerners could acquiesce to southern demands
123. Grier does appear to have joined the Dred Scott majority, in part, because he
thought having a Northern Justice support the result would make that decision more
acceptable to that region. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 311-12 (quoting Letter
from Grier to Buchanan, February 23, 1857). Nelson refused to discuss the larger issues
discussed by the other Justices. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 457-69 (1857)
(Nelson, J., concurring) (deciding only that Missouri law determined whether slavery
status reattached once Dred Scott voluntarily returned to Missouri).
124. STEPHEN ARNOLD DOUGLAS, LETTERS OF STEVEN A. DOUGLAS 182, 289
(Robert W. Johannsen ed., 1961); see JAFFA, supra note 63, at 64 ("Allowing the people to
do as they pleased was not understood by Douglas to be a policy of indifference, of voting
slavery up or down; it meant voting slavery down."); ROBERT W. JOHANNSEN, THE
FRONTIER, THE UNION AND STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 194 (1989). Henry Clay and Daniel
Webster similarly maintained that slavery would not thrive in territories west of Texas.
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that slavery be allowed in what would eventually become free states.
The initial results were politically disastrous. Free state Democrats
barely survived the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which opened formerly
free regions to slaveholders. Territorial developments during the
1850s, however, explain why a party almost destroyed by the
legislative decision in 1854 to repeal a ban on slavery in territories
north of the Missouri Compromise line could accept with some grace
the judicial decision three years later requiring slavery in all
American territories.
The parties to political debates over the status of slavery in the
territories were primarily concerned with the eventual status of
slavery in the states fashioned from those territories. Northerners of
all political persuasions wanted free territories because they wanted
free states. Additional free states facilitated northern control of the
national government125  and prevented free white labor from
competing against slave black labor. William Freehling notes,
"calling slave labor detrimental to increased labor" was "the most
lethal argument against slavery in labor-starved, development-crazed
America."' 6 Governor Alexander Randall of Wisconsin spoke for
most northerners when he insisted, "[f]ree labor languishes and
becomes degrading when put in competition with slave labor."'2 7
Antebellum Americans perceived a close connection between
territorial and state policy. "To opponents and defenders of slavery
alike," Arthur Bestor points out, "it seemed clear that the first
decisions made in the territories would be the determining ones."'28
His seminal study highlights the extent to which citizens from both
the free and slave states were convinced that "[long before a state
attained full standing, its social system could have been irrevocably
See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 1404-15 (1850); CONG. GLOBE, 31st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1266-70 (1850).
125. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 521 (1858) (speech of William H.
Seward) ("We are fighting for a majority of free states"); FONER, supra note 94, at 58, 222,
236; PARKE GODWIN, POLITICAL ESSAYS 286 (1856).
126. FREEHLING, supra note 99, at 203. Id. at 148 ("If black slaves were allowed to
spread, areas of white men's egalitarianism would further shrink: that was the political fire
ignited in the North"); see also FONER, supra note 94, at 11-72 (examining the Republican
view of the importance of free labor in contrast with Southern slavery).
127. FONER, supra note 94, at 57 (quoting Alexander W. Randall). For an antislavery
argument that highlighted the baneful influence of slave labor on free white labor, see
HENRY RUFFNER, AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF WEST VIRGINIA (1847); see also
JESSE BURTON HARRISON, REVIEW OF THE SLAVE QUESTION 10 (1833) ("Where slave
labour prevails, it is scarcely practicable for free labour to co-exist with it to any great
extent.").
128. Arthur Bestor, State Sovereignty and Slavery: A Reinterpretation of Proslavery
Constitutional Doctrine, 1846-1860, 54 ILL. ST. HIST. SOC. J. 117, 150 (1961).
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fixed by decisions irrevocably made.' 1 29 Lincoln asserted, "[t]he first
few may get slavery IN, and the subsequent many cannot easily get it
OUT."'3 ° "[TIhe character of the Territories," Preston King agreed,
"will certainly determine the character of the State."''
Antislavery fears about slave territories were warranted during
the first half of the nineteenth century. Every territory that allowed
slavery became a slave state.3 2 Illinois almost became a slave state
despite the Northwest Ordinance.'33  Both Illinois senators
consistently took southern positions during the Missouri
controversy.'34 More than forty percent of state voters in 1824
supported a referendum that would legalize human bondage.135
"[O]nly law," William Freehling concludes, "stopped slavery from
entering midwestern latitudes.' 13 6 These past practices and close calls
gave most northerners good reason to believe that, by permitting
slavery in Kansas and other territories, the Kansas-Nebraska Act
practically guaranteed that those regions would maintain human
bondage upon admission to the Union.3 ' Lincoln in 1855 thought it
an "already settled question" that Kansas would join the Union as a
slave state. 38
Developments immediately after the Kansas-Nebraska Act
challenged this axiom of American territorial politics, apparently
confirming Stephen Douglas's repeated assertions that popular
sovereignty was the least controversial means for obtaining free
states.139 By the time Dred Scott was decided, a majority of Kansans
were committed to banning slavery upon admission to the Union.40
Most southerners in the spring of 1857 had conceded that Kansas was
129. Id.
130. 3 LINCOLN, supra note 58, at 268.
131. MORRISON, supra note 41, at 150 (quoting Preston King); see id. at 109-11.
132. FREEHLING, supra note 99, at 139; GLOVER MOORE, THE MISSOURI
CONTROVERSY 1819-1821 at 53-54 (1953) (suggesting that "it would be perhaps
anachronistic to characterize [Illinois] as Northern in 1819"); id. at 85, 97, 108-09; PETER
S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 123-
30 (1987); David Brion Davis, The Significance of Excluding Slavery from the Old
Northwest in. 4787, 84 IND. MAG. HIST. 75, 78, 87-88 (1988).
133. See MOORE, supra note 132, at 53.
134. See id.
135. See ONUF, supra note 132, at 130.
136. See FREEHLING, supra note 99, at 139.
137. See BRANDON, supra note 11, at 128; 2 LINCOLN, supra note 57, at 321; see
POTTER, supra note 32, at 159-61.
138. Id.
139. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
140. See POTTER, supra note 32, at 302.
2005] 1251
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
likely to join the Union as a free state. 4' Slavery was not taking hold
in Nebraska or in other territories where that practice was permitted
by legislation or judicial decree. 142  Slavery was legal in the New
Mexico and Utah territories, but no more than one hundred slaves
were found in both jurisdictions.143 Slavery may not have reached its
natural limits by the 1850s,'" but assertions that slavery necessarily
flourished where not forbidden no longer seemed self-evident to all
northern voters. Many free state Democrats now insisted, "slavery
must certainly give way to the rapidly accumulating population and
force of white labor. '145  Other northerners agreed, claiming
"freedom can forever outrun:slavery," and "emigration from the free
states is an infinitely more easy [sic] and rapid process than
emigration from slave states.'
'1 46
The increased strength of free soil interests in territories where
slavery was nominally permitted influenced free state voting decisions
during the years between Kansas-Nebraska and Lecompton.
Democrats abandoned the party of Douglas in 1854 when they
believed making Kansas a slave territory guaranteed that Kansas
would be a slave state. 47 They began returning when many perceived
that Kansas would become a free state despite being a slave
territory. 48 Voting returns in 1856 and 1857 suggest crucial swing
voters in the free states, when confident that present slave territories
would become future free states, tolerated southern demands that
slavery be allowed in western possessions.1 49 Even Republicans upon
taking power in 1860 expressed little interest in regulating human
bondage in territories where that institution was not thriving.1 50 Some
even endorsed popular sovereignty where that policy was known to
privilege antislavery policies.
51
Lecompton was an abomination to Democrats who tolerated
Dred Scott. Northerners could not accept southern demands that
141. Id.
142. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 175-77.
143. Id.
144. See JAFFA, supra note 63, at 299, 392-93; MORRISON, supra note 41, at 112-13.
145. MORRISON, supra note 41, at 123.
146. Id. at 153.
147. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
149. See STAMPP, supra note 101, at 202-04.
150. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 245 (noting that the Republican platform in
1860 did not advocate abolition).
151. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 548; JOHANNSEN, supra note 124, at 27-28, 32,
123-24; see JAFFA, supra note 63, at 401 ("Lincoln always pointed out that there was no
need to abolish slavery in the territories; his aim was to keep it out.").
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Kansas become a slave state despite what seemed to be the presence
of a clear antislavery majority.152 Having a slave territory become a
slave state undercut Jacksonian justifications for the Kansas-
Nebraska Act. 53 Allowing a pro-slavery minority to dictate policy
violated even more fundamental Jacksonian commitments to local
majoritarianism. Democrats could concede Kansas statehood,
Stephen Douglas and his political allies realized, only at the cost of
becoming the permanent minority party in the North.'54 Fighting
Lecompton, the Little Giant and others knew, was "the only course
that could save the Northern Democracy from annihilation at the
next election."'55 Southern demands that free state Jacksonians vote
to admit Kansas and later support slave codes in the territories would
"keep the North everlasting in the chains of Black Republicanism. "156
Whatever one thinks of Dred Scott as an example of judicial
statesmanship, that alleged political miscalculation was dwarfed by
legislative and executive blunders committed during the 1850s. The
Kansas-Nebraska Act is regarded as "the most monstrous and fatal of
all political errors,"'57 rivaled only by President Buchanan's effort to
pass the Lecompton Constitution. Both proposals did far more than
the entire corpus of judicial decisions to destroy the Democratic party
and bring about the Civil War. No contemporary constitutional
theorist, however, claims Kansas-Nebraska or Lecompton
demonstrates that the elected branches of government are not
institutionally capable of resolving hotly disputed issues. Rather, a
steady torrent of criticism imagines that the extremists who
dominated the electoral branches of government would somehow
have forged a better and more durable compromise than the centrists
who controlled the Taney Court.
B. Polarized Politics, Centrist Justices
The Taney Court's. superior capacity to fashion tolerable
sectional compromises was rooted in the constitutional rules for
staffing national institutions. Article I of the United States
Constitution practically guaranteed that Congress during the 1850s
152. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 26, at 466 (quoting Letter from C. Goody to
Douglas, December 20, 1857); see DOUGLAS, supra note 124, at 404; FEHRENBACHER,
supra note 26, at 464-67, 511; JOHANNSEN, supra note 124, at 152, 197, 239; MORRISON,
supra note 41, at 200-01.
153. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 152 and sources cited.
155. Id.
156. MORRISON, supra note 41, at 224; see id. at 217,223-24.
157. ANBINDER, supra note 43, at 18.
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would be the worst imaginable site for securing a broad-based
agreement on slavery policies. When public opinion on any bitterly
contested issue is geographically concentrated, an institution whose
entire membership is elected by local constituencies is unlikely to
easily find a middle ground. 158 The institution most likely to fashion a
workable compromise is one whose members are selected by a
national political process that favors political moderates. Article III
practically guaranteed the Taney Court would be that centrist
institution.
1. Article I and Legislative Extremism
Relying entirely on local elections for staffing the national
legislature was a recipe for extremism in antebellum America.
Localities are inevitably more homogenous than the national
community. 59 This was particularly true of the United States before
the Civil War. "Colonial America was the scene of the most
extraordinary diversity of opinion," Leonard Levy notes, "but every
community ... tended to be a tight little island clutching its own
respective orthodoxy."' 60 Little changed over the next century. As a
result, the combination of "lumpy" public opinion and local elections
created a political system in which politicians competed for public
office by pledging unswerving allegiance to their community's
distinctive values.1 61 On such issues as temperance, where candidates
seeking national majorities might have temporized, candidates in the
United States tended to be militant "wets" or "drys.
162
Article I similarly privileged politicians who took
uncompromising stands on slavery. Candidates for Congress in both
the free and slave states appealed to voters by pledging to secure
sectional interests. As one commentator observed in 1860, "it is easy
in the North to gain power by denouncing slavery's existence in the
South, and as easy in the South to win favor by denouncing its
158. See AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND
PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 32-33 (1999) (noting problems with majority
rule in divided countries).
159. See generally JAMES G. GIMPEL & JASON E. SCHUKNEDIT, PATCHWORK
NATION: SECTIONALISM AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2003)
(exploring political differences among and within states).
160. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 16 (1985).
161. See JOEL H. SILBEY, THE PARTISAN IMPERATIVE: THE DYNAMICS OF
AMERICAN POLITICS BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 5 (1985).
162. See RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE 18TH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE
REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920 at 11-13 (1995) (noting sharp
local differences in temperance policies).
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northern opponents." '163 Taking advantage of the Constitution's
electoral rules, "extremists, North and South, together constituted a
majority in Congress."'" Individual extremists may have represented
the majority in their districts, but single-membered districts inflated
their numbers in the House of Representatives with respect to the
general population. The approximately forty percent of Americans
who voted for Stephen Douglas or John Bell in 1860 could be fairly
represented in Congress only if they were majorities in forty percent
of all congressional districts. When sixty percent of the voters in most
southern congressional districts favored aggressively expanding
slavery and sixty percent of the voters in most northern congressional
districts favored placing slavery "on the path of ultimate
extinction,, 161 the legislative power of the sizeable bloc of centrist
voters was substantially diminished.
Constitutional rules frequently facilitated the election of free
state congressmen who held more extreme antislavery views than the
average voter in their state or district. The constitutional
requirement that state legislatures choose senators enabled free soil
minorities who held the balance of power in many northern states to
trade votes on all local issues with the major party that supported
their preferred Senate candidate. 166 This bargain was quite attractive.
Most state legislators were more concerned with local matters than
national politics. 167 Free state politicians never confronted an equally
committed proslavery minority that would withdraw from any
coalition that made deals with freesoilers. Salmon Chase, Charles
Sumner, and Benjamin Wade were among the antislavery advocates
who gained national office through such arrangements.1 61 Similar
considerations influenced House elections in the North. When single-
issue anti-slavery advocates held the balance of power in a
congressional district, one or both parties frequently increased their
antislavery advocacy in order to gain majorities for their economic
programs. 16 9
Article I also created pressures for increasing sectionalism in
southern elections. Antebellum slave state politicians gained office
163. MORRISON, supra note 41, at 1.
164. Id. at 125; see id. at 271.
165. 3 LINCOLN, supra note 58, at 18.
166. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
167. Id.
168. RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1837-1860 at 180, 210, 221 (1976).
169. Id. at 167-69.
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by "identifying their party with the South" and "portray[ing] their
political enemy.., as less than fully alert in protecting the treasure of
southern liberty.""17 George Troup observes how slave state parties
spent their energies "cutting one another's throats in the controversy
as to which of the two belongs the higher degree of abolitionism." '171
When one party introduced a new proslavery demand, all southern
politicians were under great pressure to support and extend that
demand. "Any suggestion of trimming by a party or of less than all-
out effort would cause terrible political damage," William Cooper
declares, "because the party would find itself in the dock accused of
violating its compact with the South, of failing to protect vigorously
and at all costs southern interests."'72  Cooper's study of the
constitutional politics of slavery notes how "Calhounite pressures of
the Democrats to satisfy their demands on sectional issues inevitably
resulted in democratic pressure on Whigs to equal the Democratic
performance." '173 Unless they could be tainted with secession,
174
southern politicians almost never lost elections by making too
extreme a defense of slavery.
Sectionalism fed on sectionalism. As southern politicians bid to
demonstrate they were the best protectors of slavery, the risk always
existed that conversation would turn from policies fairly easy for
northern majorities to stomach (gag rules) to policies far more
controversial in the North (abandonment of the Missouri
Compromise). Free state politicians willing to accommodate slave
state politicians instantly became electorally vulnerable. "[N]orthern
Whigs," Cooper notes, "had constantly denounced northern
Democrats for bowing to southern demands. ' 175 The louder the cry
of "Slavepower" from the North, the more southern parties competed
over which coalition was most committed to human bondage.1 76 The
more provocative the demand generated by the politics of slavery in
170. WILLIAM J. COOPER, JR., LIBERTY AND SLAVERY: SOUTHERN POLITICS TO
1860 at 197 (1983) [hereinafter COOPER, LIBERTY AND SLAVERY]; see WILLIAM J.
COOPER, JR., THE SOUTH AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY, 1828-1856 at 96-97, 145, 370-
71 (1978) [hereinafter COOPER, THE SOUTH] (discussing the great importance southerners
placed on southern heritage, including maintaining the institution of slavery).
171. COOPER, THE SOUTH, supra note 170, at 148.
172. COOPER, LIBERTY AND SLAVERY, supra note 170, at 183; see also id. at 222
("[T]he politics of slavery guaranteed the political destruction of any violator."); COOPER,
THE SOUTH, supra note 170, at 112 (noting that "the politics of slavery destroyed those
judged faithless").
173. COOPER, THE SOUTH, supra note 170, at 116-17.
174. See FREEHLING, supra note 99, at 523-28.
175. COOPER, THE SOUTH, supra note 170, at 281.
176. COOPER, LIBERTY AND SLAVERY, supra note 170, at 183.
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the South, the more northern politicians competed to prove their
independence from the slave power. 177 Border state representatives
aside, the Constitution placed few politicians seeking elective office in
positions where they could resist sectional pressures.
Constitutional federalism further exacerbated sectional tensions.
Not being responsible to national constituencies, state and local
officials frequently adopted policies that strained relationships among
national elites interested in compromise. 178  Representatives in
national coalitions passed strict fugitive slave laws and condemned
filibustering in central America. 79  State officials passed personal
liberty laws in the North and supported private efforts to secure new
slave territories in the South. 8 Federal Justices confirmed by
national majorities were far more accommodating on fugitive slave
issues than state justices who owed their positions to local officials or
electorates.18 ' Had national majorities the sole power to determine
fugitive slave policy, this sectional irritant would have been
substantially alleviated.
Article I helped transform the Kansas-Nebraska Act from a
debate between Democrats and Whigs to an imbroglio between the
North and South.82 The crucial turning point in the Congressional
debate occurred when Senator Thomas Dixon from Kentucky
proposed amending the original bill to make the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise Bill explicit. 83 Dixon did so because he was a
politically vulnerable Whig from a state increasingly inclined to
support Jacksonians. 84 Southern Democrats, not wanting to be
177. See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. See generally Gavin B. Henderson, Southern Designs on Cuba, 1854-1857 and
Some European Opinions, 5 J. S. HIST. 371, 373-74 (1939) (discussing the strong Southern
influence in the United States' efforts to acquire Cuba and resistance to this acquisition by
northerners and the British).
180. See THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF
THE NORTH 1780-1861 at 42-58 (1974).
181. Compare Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 617-22 (1842) (sustaining
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793) and Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 229-30
(1847) (same) with Jack v. Martin, 14 Wend. 507, 526 (N.Y. 1835) (declaring
unconstitutional the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793) and In re Booth and Rycraft, 3 Wis. 157,
211 (1855) (declaring unconstitutional the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850).
182. The best accounts of this transformation are FREEHLING, supra note 99, at 536-
65, and MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY:
JACKSONIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 804-35 (1999).
183. See COOPER, THE SOUTH, supra note 170, at 349-51.
184. See id. at 349-50 (stating that Dixon prepared the amendment due to his concern
for the continued existence of slavery in the South).
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outbid in the politics of slavery, made that demand their own."'
Freesoilers, wishing to make inroads into the northern electorate,
responded with an "Appeal to Independent Democrats," denouncing
the Kansas bill as a sellout to the slavepower. 186 Northern Whigs, in
order to prevent defections to freesoil coalitions, began attacking
Kansas-Nebraska as a southern rather than a Jacksonian measure.187
Slave state Whigs initially inclined to oppose Kansas-Nebraska as
another ill-fated Democratic effort at expansion188 could not
politically withhold support once opposition was tainted with
abolitionism. 89  Increased southern Whig support for Kansas-
Nebraska further increased northern perceptions that the bill was
motivated by the slavepower. As northern Whigs increased anti-
southern rhetoric, southern Whigs became even more vulnerable to
charges that they were allied with a party bent on destroying the
South. 9 ' By the final debates, what began as a normal partisan
struggle had evolved into a sectional crisis.
Hardly any elected politician in 1854 could resist the electoral
incentives to make sectional appeals. Southerners debating Kansas-
Nebraska competed to determine who better protected slavery. 91
Northerners debating Kansas-Nebraska competed to determine who
was in thrall to the slavepower.' 92 Few national legislators worried
about the average national citizen. 193 No Congressman had to gain
popular national majorities to retain office and few had constituencies
whose opinions mirrored national sentiment.194 Had officials in at
least one elected branch of the national government been obliged to
appeal to a national constituency for reelection, far more
representatives would have had incentives to treat Kansas-Nebraska
as a dispute between Whigs and Jacksonians over westward
expansion than a dispute between the North and South over slavery.
The constitutional politics of slavery similarly aggravated conflict
over Kansas statehood. Slave state Democrats could not risk
185. See id. at 346.
186. HOLT, supra note 182, at 908.
187. Id.
188. See AVERY 0. CRAVEN, THE GROWTH OF SOUTHERN NATIONALISM 1848-1861
at 192-95, 201-03 (Wesley H. Stevenson ed., 1953).
189. Id. at 203-04.
190. See COOPER, LIBERTY AND SLAVERY, supra note 170, at 241-47, 357-63, 373;
CRAVEN, supra note 188, at 205; HOLT, supra note 182, at 908-09.
191. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 187-88, 190 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
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bisectionalism after annihilating the Whigs. During the late 1850s,
''every political group opposed to the Democrats slashed at the
dominant party with the politics of slavery." '195 Democrats responded
as they always had, by accusing their rivals of "betraying the interests
of the South," and "snip[ing] at the Democrats rather than join[ing]
forces to present a united front to the new, determined enemy. "196
Slaveholders in this electoral environment who thought the
Lecompton Constitution fraudulent or the long term prospects for
slavery in Kansas dubious could not politically afford to compromise.
"[S]hould the southern Democrats allow a new slave state to slip
through their grasp," Cooper points out, "they would hand their
opponents a golden political issue.' 197 Charles Conrad, a moderate
southern Whig, noted that "the clamor that has been raised" in favor
of Kansas prevented "even... those who were originally opposed to
it" from making "any attempt to repeal it."' 98 Many Democrats from
the northwest were as electorally vulnerable. Voting for Kansas
statehood conceded the next election to Republicans. "We could
never recover from it," the Jacksonian editor of the Chicago Times
informed Stephen Douglas. 99 A constitution that mandated sectional
elections, in short, compelled most politicians facing tough choices in
1857 to err on the side of sectionalism.
2. Article III and Judicial Moderation
In sharp contrast to candidates for the national legislature,
persons seeking federal judicial office are best off having ambivalent,
unknown or centrist views on the hotly contested constitutional issues
of the day.2°° Supreme Court Justices are nominated by the President,
the only elected official in the national government chosen by a
national electorate. Judicial nominees must then be confirmed by a
Senate composed of two representatives from each state. Successful
nominees during times of sectional strife need strong bisectional
support, strong bipartisan support, or near unanimous support from
politically moderate senators. Persons with known militant views on
such issues as abortion or slavery need not apply, unless their faction
has supermajoritarian control of the national government or their
195. COOPER, LIBERTY AND SLAVERY, supra note 170, at 258; see COOPER, THE
SOUTH, supra note 170, at 374 (describing the backlash against the Democrats).
196. COOPER, LIBERTY AND SLAVERY, supra note 170, at 258.
197. Id. at 260.
198. HOLT, supra note 182, at 925.
199. STAMPP, supra note 101, at 291 (quoting James W. Sheahan).
200. See infra notes 202-18 and accompanying text.
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vote is not likely to be decisive on any crucial issue.
This structural bias toward moderation helps explain the
remarkable centrism of Taney Court Justices. The tribunal that
decided Dred Scott was dominated by southern unionists and
conservative northerners.01  Presidents after the Mexican War
scrutinized potential nominees to ensure they would enjoy bisectional
support.202 They were largely successful in securing a federal bench
relatively immune from sectional allegiances. Only one member of
the Dred Scott Court, Justice Peter Daniel, is fairly characterized as a
southern extremist.2 3  Justice John Campbell was a reluctant
secessionist.2° Justices John Catron and James Wayne were the two
highest-ranking national officials from seceding states who did not
resign their positions after secession.2 5 Justices Robert Grier and
Samuel Nelson were conservative northern Democrats. 26  Chief
Justice Taney was a conservative border-state Democrat.2 7 Justice
Benjamin Curtis was a Cotton Whig who, after 1857, sided more
often with Democrats then Republicans.2 8 Justice John McLean was
a conservative Republican.2 9
201. See infra notes 204-15 and accompanying text.
202. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS AND SENATORS: A HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO
CLINTON 82-85 (1999).
203. See generally JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF
PETER V. DANIEL, 1784-1860 (1964) (characterizing Justice Daniel as a proponent of
agrarianism, federalism, and secession).
204. See ROBERT SAUNDERS, JR., JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL: SOUTHERN
MODERATE 1811-1889 at 138-45 (1997); SWISHER, supra note 85, at 739-40.
205. See ALEXANDER A. LAWRENCE, JAMES MOORE WAYNE: SOUTHERN UNIONIST
180-83 (1943); Frank Otto Gatell, James M. Wayne, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 601, 609
(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).
206. See Frank Otto Gatell, Samuel Nelson, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 817, 817, 823-
24 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980); Frank Otto Gatell, Robert C. Grier, in
supra, 873,878-79, 883.
207. See generally CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1961) (noting that the
Maryland native, while not an advocate of slavery, believed that Southern culture was
worth preserving and favored a political compromise that avoided the subjugation or
secession of the South).
208. See generally THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF B.R. CURTIS: A MEMOIR OF
BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, LL.D.: WITH SOME OF HIS PROFESSIONAL AND
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS (1879) (explaining that by the early 1860s Justice Curtis no
longer considered himself affiliated with any political party).
209. See generally FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER, THE LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN: A
POLITICIAN ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1971) (stating that Justice
McLean hoped to secure the Republican party's nomination in the 1856 national
convention).
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The Taney Court was a bastion of moderation, particularly when
compared to the national legislature. Of the nine Justices on the
Supreme Court, only one, Daniel, identified with southern
fireeaters210 and only one, McLean, identified with the antislavery
movement.2 ' This was a far lower percentage of sectional extremists
than found in the antebellum Congress. If all members of the
national government in 1857 were divided into quintiles on the basis
of opinions about slavery, a five person judicial majority composed of
Wayne, Catron, Curtis, Nelson and Grier would belong in the middle
quintile. Two Justices, Taney and Campbell, are best placed at the
more moderate end of the less extreme pro-slavery quintile. One,
McLean, is best placed in the middle of the less extreme antislavery
quintile. Daniel aside, the two most extreme quintiles would be
populated exclusively by those elected officials whom institutional
theory expects could have reached a compromise on slavery had the
Supreme Court not interfered.
The national institution staffed by the greatest percentage of
political moderates was also the national institution whose decision
rules most privilege the center. Judicial rules vest far more power in
the median Justice than legislative practices vest in the median
representative. The separation of powers requires moderates to gain
simple majorities in the House of Representatives, the Senate, and
the presidency (or supermajorities in the first two) to pass legislation.
Internal legislative rules further hinder majority coalitions.213 The
Supreme Court eschews practices analogous to the committee system,
the open debate rule in the Senate, and the presidential veto. Votes
are taken one case, often one issue, at a time. Justices do not trade
votes, gaining support for some proposals by sacrificing other
constitutional values. With rare exception,214 these decision rules
empower median Justices on all issues before the Court. A Justice in
that enviable position need not bargain with extremists. Justice Lewis
Powell, the median Justice during the 1970s, "rarely negotiated over
opinions, in part because his position at the Court's center meant that
210. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
318 (1926).
211. Id. at 71.
212. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
213. See KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 230
(1998).
214. See generally MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL
CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (2000) (introducing social
choice theory to explain how constitutional law is made and detailing how Supreme Court
decisions transform judicial preferences into constitutional doctrine).
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his colleagues had to move to meet him.... 215
The judicial decision rules that vested virtually all judicial power
in the median Justices guaranteed that Justices Catron, Grier, Wayne,
Curtis and Nelson effectively controlled any decision the Supreme
Court made on slavery. Northern Republicans and southern
disunionists in the antebellum Congress could wield weapons against
border state accommodationists not possessed by their counterparts
in the judiciary. Justice Daniel could not filibuster against, and Chief
Justice Taney could not veto, anti-slavery rulings. Justice McLean did
not chair a subcommittee that might forestall more proslavery
decisions. Justices Daniel and McLean could not trade votes so as to
forge an alliance of the judicial extremes against the judicial middle.
If three or four of the five centrist Justices on the Taney Court
reached a common position on any sectional issue, they had the
power to ensure that agreement became the constitutional law of the
land.
Popular support for the Supreme Court provides a final reason
why the federal judiciary in 1857 and at present has unique capacities
to promote political compromise. Judicial decisions often provide
cover for political actors who cannot advocate certain policies
directly.216 Just as many politicians who do not vote to repeal bans on
abortion nevertheless insist that the Supreme Court's decision in Roe
v. Wade217 be obeyed,2 8 so Northern Democrats who might not have
been able to vote for measures repealing the Missouri Compromise or
making slavery legal in all territories nevertheless proclaimed Dred
Scott to be good law.219 Northern Democrats could accept southern
pretensions in the territories as long as they could do so indirectly by
pointing to a judicial decision rather than by expressing personal
support for slavery. Legislative deference to the judiciary was a
compromise that enabled slave states to gain desired policies without
requiring their free state allies to vote for those measures.
Structured by staffing and decision rules that favor political
moderates, the Taney Court was a forum of compromise. The
Justices from 1837 until 1857 consistently found the political center on
issues of national importance. Judicial rulings on the commerce
215. Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1856 (1995).
216. Graber, supra note 80, at 42-43; see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 33-36 (1991).
217. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
218. Graber, supra note 80, at 56-59.
219. See supra notes 54, 73-74 and accompanying text.
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clause and the contracts clause regularly took "a middle-and
generally popular-ground. '220  When faced with competing
constitutional claims that, in the absence of federal regulation, states
either had no power or absolute freedom to regulate interstate
commerce, the judicial majority in 1851 creatively concluded that
states could regulate interstate commerce in the absence of federal
legislation on matters of more local concern, but not on matters of
more national concern.221  The Taney Court refused to use the
contracts clause to police state regulation as aggressively as most
Whigs wished, and refused to abandon contract clause scrutiny as
more radical Jacksonians desired.222
On the issues that most clearly divided the radicals from centrists
within each section of the United States, Taney Court Justices
aggressively championed accommodation. Northern moderates
tolerated judicial decisions protecting southern rights in the territories
and they insisted that the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 be
strictly enforced. The Supreme Court during the 1840s and 1850s
declared unconstitutional bans on slavery in the territories and
sustained federal power to pass fugitive slave laws.223 Justices Grier,
Curtis, and Nelson on circuit distinguished themselves defending
national power to recapture fugitive slaves.224 Southern moderates
opposed secession and they insisted that federal laws banning the
international slave trade be strictly enforced.225 Although these issues
did not come before the Supreme Court during the 1840s and 1850s,
the Justices from the slave states on that tribunal consistently sided
220. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 32, at 58. McCloskey discussed the non-sectional rulings
of the Taney Court under the sub-heading "The Court's Policy of Moderation," and the
first sentence in that section declared, "[t]he theme of the adjustment process ... was
compromise." Id. at 56.
221. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 318-19 (1851).
222. See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 349-52 (1855); Proprietors of the
Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 539-40
(1837). For the partisan politics underlying these cases, see 2 WARREN, supra note 210, at
21-25,249-56.
223. Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 232 (1847); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41
U.S. (16. Pet.) 539 (1842).
224. For Grier, see Ex parte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 7,259);
Van Metre v. Mitchell, 28 F. Cas. 1036 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 16,865); United States v.
Hanway, 26 F. Cas. 105 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) (No. 15,299); Oliver v. Kaufman, 18 F. Cas.
657 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) (No. 10, 497). For Curtis, see Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas.
983 (C.C.D. Mass. 1854) (No. 18,250); United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815). For Nelson, see Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1013
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 18,262); Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1007 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1851) (No. 18,261).
225. See infra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
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with southern unionists against more extreme factions. Justices
Campbell, Wayne and Catron opposed secession. 26  Justices
Campbell and Wayne on circuit defended national power to ban the
importation of slaves.227 Their opinions in these cases mirrored those
issued by northern Justices in fugitive slave cases. The same
principles northern judicial moderates invoked when justifying broad
federal power to return fugitive slaves, southern judicial moderates
invoked when justifying broad federal power to prevent the
importation of foreign slaves.
Justice Joseph Story's infamous opinion in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania228 stressed the importance of sectional accommodation
to the persons responsible for the constitution. The fugitive slave
clause, he wrote, was a "compromise of opposing interests and
opinions" that was "so vital to the preservation of [slave state]
domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be doubted that it
constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the
Union could not have been formed." '229 Vital constitutional interests
called forth broad federal powers. Rejecting claims that Article IV
merely imposed obligations on state governments, Story insisted,
"[i]f... the Constitution guarantees the right,... the [national]
government is clothed with the appropriate authority and functions to
enforce it.""23 This enforcement power was substantial. The national
legislature could employ "all the modes of attaining" an efficient
rendition process "which Congress, in their discretion,... [claims is]
expedient or proper. '231  In language that recalls John Marshall's
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland,232 Story declared, "[Congress]
may prescribe the mode and extent in which [federal power] shall be
applied, and how, and under what circumstances the proceedings
shall afford a complete protection and guarantee to the right" to
recapture fugitive slaves.233
This broad federal power trumped any claim of state prerogative
or sovereignty. Story ruled that no local rule could "in any way
226. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
227. See United States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860) (No. 15,329)
(Campbell, J.); Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1026 (C.C.D. Ga. 1859) (No. 18,269a)
(Wayne, J.). Taney, Catron, and Daniel, when riding circuit, did not confront
constitutional questions about the federal power to ban the international slave trade.
228. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
229. Id. at 610-11.
230. Id. at 615.
231. Id. at 617.
232. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
233. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 616.
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qualify, regulate, control, or restrain" a slaveholder seeking to
recapture a runaway.234 All northern personal liberty laws were
unconstitutional, no matter how minor the interference with the
rendition process or how necessary to prevent the enslavement of free
persons of color. Story put antislavery advocates on notice that
federal courts would void "any state law or state regulation, which
interrupts, limits, delays, or postpones the right of the owner to the
immediate possession of his slave. "235
Justices Campbell and Wayne made nearly identical arguments
when sustaining federal laws criminalizing the international slave
trade. Campbell in United States v. naun236 began as Story did in
Prigg, by emphasizing sectional accommodations reached in 1787.
"The power of congress to pass laws to prohibit the importation of
Africans," he wrote, "forms one of the compromises on which the
constitution rests. '23 7 Both southern Justices insisted on the need for
broad federal power to secure that constitutional concession.
Wayne's opinion defended legislation imposing the death penalty for
any person serving on a ship engaged in the slave trade.238  "The
power of congress to suppress the slave trade, by passing all laws
necessary and proper for that purpose," he insisted, "is not
questioned by any one at all conversant with the constitution and
constitutional history of the United States."239 Campbell championed
an even broader construction of the federal power when sustaining
Congressional power to punish those who knowing purchased
illegally imported slaves.4 He firmly rejected claims that "the power
of congress is limited to a cognizance of the acts of the importer.
241
Such a view was inconsistent with the "power of congress to provide
for the seizure and removal of persons coming to the country illegally
and without their consent.214 2 The "necessary and proper" clause,
Campbell stated, demonstrated that "[t]he constitution has not left
the power of the federal government to employ the means requisite
to fulfill its obligations, and to execute its authority to cavil or
question. '243 Campbell further maintained that the power to ban the
234. Id. at 612.
235. Id. at 613.
236. 26 F. Cas. 227,231 (C.C.S.D. Ala 1860) (No. 15,329).
237. Id. at 231.
238. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, 3 Stat. 600, 600-01.
239. Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1026, 1030 (C.C. D. Ga 1859) (No. 18269).
240. Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, 3 Stat. 450, 452 (1818).
241. Haun, 26 F. Cas. at 230.
242. Id. at 230.
243. Id. at 232.
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international slave trade could be derived from both the commerce
clause and "the power to define and punish offences against the law
of nations."'2" As such, he concluded, "the suppression of the slave
trade... belongs to the jurisdiction of congress as a part of that
foreign intercourse of the Union which is submitted to its exclusive
control."245
State rights had to give way whenever Congress acted under its
power to regulate foreign commerce or prevent violations of the laws
of nations. Justice Campbell maintained that national laws "are not
dependent upon the state governments for ancillary legislation, nor
can they be obstructed by their inaction or opposition." '246 He
concluded with a Marshallean flourish. "No more striking illustration
of the force and accuracy of this opinion of the supreme court [in
McCulloch v. Maryland247] can be adduced," he declared:
[T]han might be afforded by the concession that the power of
congress over the slave trade terminates after the introduction
and sale of the Africans in the states. The slave trade might be
as a matter of fact reopened, by the neglect or refusal of a state
to enact or enforce prohibitory laws for it can hardly be
supposed that every port and inlet of the United States will
always be properly guarded, so as to prevent their introduction
and sale.248
These opinions by the southern members of the Taney Court
defending broad federal power to prohibit the international slave
trade place in a different light analogous opinions by the northern
members of the Taney Court defending broad federal power over the
rendition of fugitive slaves. Prigg and related decisions are constantly
reviled for protecting human bondage far more than was
constitutionally necessary. 249  The same constitutional logics that
justified upholding federal fugitive slave laws, however, were also
used to sustain federal efforts to eradicate the importation of foreign
slaves. No evidence exists of an explicit understanding between
federal Justices. Nevertheless, had Prigg been decided differently,
southern Justices on the Taney Court might have had stronger
244. Id. at 231.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
248. Haun, 26 F. Cas. at 232.
249. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 257 (1975); Ronald Dworkin, The Law of the Slave-Catchers, TIMES LITERARY
SUPPLEMENT, Dec. 5,1975, at 1437.
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precedential or political reasons for deciding such cases as Haun
differently. Given the relative number of slaves involved, a good case
can be made that the judicial commitment to broad federal power
over both fugitive and imported slaves alleviated far more human
suffering than would have been the case had the Justices adopted a
more narrow interpretation of congressional authority.2 °
Prigg and Haun read in conjunction suggest that the political
center during the 1850s was occupied by Americans who supported
broad federal power to return fugitive slaves and suppress the
international slave trade. These political moderates were willing to
support a judicial ban on legislation prohibiting slavery in any
American territory, but they opposed secession. Electoral institutions
had difficulty reaching and sustaining these compromises. National
legislators were depended upon local constituencies, who frequently
favored more sectional positions. State legislators had no need to
bargain with legislators who hailed from other sections. The federal
judiciary, the only national institution whose staffing and decisions
rules empowered political moderates, was the only national
institution whose members consistently championed every policy
favored by antebellum political moderates.
That Dred Scott and Prigg championed centrist policies hardly
justifies those judicial rulings. The difference between laws requiring
the rendition of fugitive slaves and laws prohibiting the international
slave trade is that the former violate and the latter protect basic
human rights. What is wrong with Dred Scott is what is wrong with
slavery and racism. Antebellum Americans may be justly condemned
for being willing to accept a political compromise based on gross
racial discrimination and even grosser violations of fundamental
human liberties.
Contemporary commitments to human freedom and racial
liberalism better explain attacks on Dred Scott than institutionalist
concerns with national unity. One suspects when contemporary
commentators condemn Taney Court rulings for inhibiting some
other legislative accommodation, what they really mean is that Dred
Scott is wrong for forestalling the possibility of a more antislavery
250. Prigg and Haun similarly rise and fall together as exercises in originalism. Paul
Finkelman correctly points out that the Framers did not think the fugitive slave clause a
vital constitutional compromise. Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court:
Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story's Judicial Nationalism, 1994 Sup. CT. REV.
247, 259 (1994). Justice Campbell's claim that congressional power over the international
slave trade was as vital a constitutional compromise is similarly dubious. United States v.
Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227, 231 (C.C. S.D. Ala. 1860) (No. 15,329).
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legislative compromise. The problem with this analysis is that no
judicial decision or legislative decree that struck a serious blow at
slavery was likely to preserve union in the late 1850s. Not by writ, but
by power would the slaves be freed. The practical choice when
Lincoln was elected president was between a permanent union with
slaveholders or civil war. Dred Scott is wrong only if slavery were
sufficiently evil to warrant political actions that would "purge this
land in blood.
2 51
CONCLUSION: TO THE PRESENT
Neither Dred Scott nor the Taney Court were aberrations. The
Supreme Court has frequently exhibited tendencies to take centrist
positions during times of political polarization. The Justices on the
Fuller, White, and Taft Courts refused to police state laws as
aggressively as most conservatives desired, while also refusing to take
the "hands off" position favored by most progressives. While "the
judges" sometimes "talked ... as if they were determined to halt the
regulatory movement in its tracks," Robert McCloskey observes,
"they ratified many inroads on the free enterprise ideal and sought
only to moderate ... the growth of government. ' ' 2 Maximum hour
laws were constitutional in the mines253 and factories z4 but not in
bakeries. 5  The federal government was deemed to have power to
prevent the interstate shipment of lottery tickets, 256 adulterated
eggs,257 and loose women, 58 but not products of child labor. 9
The contemporary United States provides a clearer instance of
polarized politics and centrist Justices. "Over the past two
generations," Professors H.W. Perry and L.A. Powe observe, "the
Democratic Party and Republican Party have come to conceptions of
the United States Constitution that are fundamentally different.
These "visions," in turn, "differ from the Constitution as interpreted
by the U.S. Supreme Court. ' '2 ° As was the case during the 1850s, the
Supreme Court at the beginning of the second Bush administration
251. These issues are discussed at length in the last section of GRABER, DRED SCOTT
AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (forthcoming).
252. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 32, at 91.
253. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 395 (1898).
254. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426,439 (1917).
255. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905).
256. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363--64 (1903).
257. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1911).
258. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913).
259. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271-74 (1918).
260. Perry & Powe, supra note 21 (manuscript at 1).
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occupies the center of American politics. At a time when the two
major parties frequently stake out policy positions on the relative
extremes of American politics, the Supreme Court has consistently
taken a middle position, more consistent with public opinion. "[I]n a
political world where the parties have become more polarized," Perry
and Powe point out, "the Court in forging a majority opinion is
offering the bipartisanship that the public purports to want but is
otherwise so lacking in Washington.
2 61
This combination of electoral extremism and legal centrism is
manifested across numerous policy dimensions. Republicans
emphasize crime control when discussing the rights of criminal
suspects.262 Democrats focus on due process concerns.263 While not
overruling the landmark decisions of the Warren Court on criminal
procedure,2" the Supreme Court has cut back on those rights in many
areas.265  Judicial majorities demand that petitioners demonstrate a
clear error when making Fourth Amendment violations in habeas
corpus appeals, 26 but not when making petitioners claim Fifth
Amendment violations.267  Republicans oppose affirmative action.
Democrats favor race-conscious measures. 26s  The Supreme Court
insists that all race-conscious measures meet a strict scrutiny
standard, 269 but has watered down that standard so that "strict in
theory" no longer means "fatal in fact. ' 270 Republicans believe that
abortion should be banned.2 1  Democrats believe that abortion
261. Id. (manuscript at 3).
262. Id. (manuscript at 21-25).
263. Id. (manuscript at 25-29).
264. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 661, 574 (2002) (reaffirming Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), when holding that a person given a suspended sentence
had a constitutional right to counsel); United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 431-32
(2000) (reaffirming Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) as the proper rule for
determining coerced confessions); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311-12, 319-20 (1990)
(reaffirming Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) when holding that state may not impeach
a defense witness with evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
265. See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) (the exclusion rule
laid out in Mapp does not apply to evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment when used at a parole revocation hearing); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972) (holding that only persons accused of a crime punishable by a jail sentence have
a right to counsel under Gideon); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (evidence
obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach a criminal defendant).
266. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,494 (1976).
267. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 682-83 (1993).
268. See Perry & Powe, supra note 21 (manuscript at 39-45).
269. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-31 (1995).
270. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
271. See Perry & Powe, supra 21 (manuscript at 45-52).
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should be legal and federally funded.272 The Supreme Court has ruled
that abortion should be legal 327 but that states have no obligation to
fund abortions. 274 The Justices have sustained most regulations on
abortion,275 short of those that ban abortion or particular abortion
techniques. 6 Republicans support prayer in school and state aid to
parochial schools. 277 Democrats support a high wall between church
and state. 278 The Supreme Court continues to strike down prayer in
school, 279 but has supported vouchers and other laws that permit
federal funds to help parochial schools.
280
Several political science studies confirm that the contemporary
Supreme Court has no tendency to take positions more extreme than
the elected branches of the national government. Thomas Marshall
finds that "nearly half the modern Court's judicial decisions [are]
majoritarian. '' 28 1  In many cases, his research demonstrates, the
Justices are far more attuned than legislators to popular sentiment.
Burger and early Rehnquist Court Justices consistently "supported
nationwide polls rather than a law (or policy) that was inconsistent
with public opinion." '282 William Mishler and Reginald Sheehan
agree. Their time series analysis finds that judicial decisions from
1956 to 1989 "were highly responsive to majoritarian opinion. '28 3 The
judicial tendency to be somewhat more conservative than the general
public during the 1980s, they maintain, was a consequence of the even
greater countermajoritarian conservative tendencies of the Reagan
and first Bush administrations.2 4
Polarized electoral politics during the mid-nineteenth and late-
twentieth century help explain these centrist judicial proclivities. Just
as the constitutional politics of the 1850s yielded a federal bench
controlled by southern unionists and northern conservatives, so
272. Id. (manuscript at 45-52).
273. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992).
274. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977); Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 312-23
(1980).
275. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-87, 899-910.
276. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 931-46 (2000).
277. See Perry & Powe, supra note 21 (manuscript at 57-65).
278. Id. (manuscript at 65-72).
279. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-96 (1992); Santa Fe Independent School
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301-10 (2000).
280. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649-63 (2002).
281. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 97 (1989).
282. Id.
283. William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court
Decisions, 87 AM. POLl. SC. REV. 87, 97 (1993).
284. Id. at 97-98.
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constitutional politics for the past generation has generated a court
dominated by "country-club Republicans" who wish only to trim the
excesses of the Great Society and have little affinity with more
religious conservatives.285 [A]s the politics of Congress bec[a]me more
extreme," Perry and Powe point out, "ideological non-centrist justices
[were] less likely to survive a Congressional vetting. '286  Mark
Silverstein's study of the contemporary judicial selection process
similarly concludes that "[e]xperienced, competent, noncontroversial
jurists ... may be the best the modern system can offer.
287
Extremists need not apply, unless they are replacing a member of the
more extreme wing of the Court. Antonin Scalia could replace
Warren Burger, largely because Burger's vote was not critical on any
crucial issue that divided Democrats from Republicans.288 When
President Reagan attempted to replace the moderate conservative
Lewis Powell with the more extreme Robert Bork, a political
imbroglio broke out. The end result was Bork's defeat and the
successful nomination of the more centrist Anthony Kennedy.
289
Whether the federal judiciary will continue playing a moderating
role in American politics is an open question. Courts tend to be
centrist in times of polarized politics only when neither competing
partisan faction is able to establish complete control over all elected
branches of the national government. The Supreme Court after 1936
was not a centrist institution partly because Democrats had
established sufficient control over the presidency and Senate to
ensure a Court committed to working out, rather than trimming, New
Deal and Great Society principles.290 Whether the 2002 and 2004
285. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
148 (1999). See generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST
COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005) [hereinafter TUSHNET,
COURT DIVIDED] (noting that while a majority of the Court is compromised of Justices
holding generally conservative views, only those cases involving economics and fiscal
policy have resulted in rulings favorable to the Republican right, while the conservative
Justices have splintered in rendering opinions on social issues, leading to an affirmation of
abortion rights and a nullification of laws criminalizing homosexual sodomy).
286. Perry & Powe, supra note 21 (manuscript at 81).
287. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME
COURT CONFIRMATIONS 171 (1994).
288. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY
OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 295
(1999).
289. See MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE RISING: THE
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION 237-40 (1989).
290. For studies documenting the Court's commitment to New Deal and Great Society
principles, see generally KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE:
HOW THE PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN (2004) (arguing that President
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national elections will give the Republican Party similar control over
the national government is unclear.29' President Bush's decision to
renominate for positions on the federal bench those conservative
activists who were successively filibustered during his first term, 92
combined with Republican threats to eliminate filibusters in the
judicial confirmation process,293 indicate that a serious attempt is
being made to remake the judiciary in the image of the most
conservative wing of the Republican party. The extent to which such
efforts can be resisted or are largely political posturing is for the
future to determine.
Whether the federal judiciary should play a moderating role
during times of political polarization is also an open question.
Compromises are not necessarily desirable. Abraham Lincoln
thought Dred Scott too high a price for preserving the peace. "I am
for no compromise," he informed William Seward, "which assists or
permits the extension of [slavery] on soil owned by the nation.
294
Pro-life advocates who equate slavery and abortion disdain
compromises that sanctity the slaughter of countless unborn lives. 95
Pro-choice advocates have been similarly reluctant to make
concessions on abortion. To abandon strict scrutiny for a less
protective standard, Kathryn Kolbert informed the Supreme Court
during oral argument in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,96 would be the
same as overruling Roe v. Wade.97
Nevertheless, constitutions require some compromise both when
being created and when being maintained. James Madison observed
that "a faultless plan was not to be expected," given the "variety of
interests" represented at the framing convention in Philadelphia. 98
Franklin D. Roosevelt's commitment to such principles was demonstrated by Supreme
Court appointments); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICS (2000) (discussing over 200 case studies and showing how the Warren Court
influenced and was influenced by politics).
291. See TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED, supra note 285, at 319-45; L.A. Powe, Jr., The
Not-So-Brave New Constitutional Order, 117 HARv. L. REV. 647, 680-87 (2003)
(reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)).
292. See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Tries Again on Court Choices Stalled in Senate, N.Y.
TIMES Dec. 24, 2004, at Al.
293. Helen Dewer & Mike Allen, GOP May Target Use of Filibuster, WASH. POST,
Dec. 13, 2004, at Al.
294. 4 LINCOLN, supra note 94, at 183.
295. Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe, "Public Reason" and Reasons for Action
by Public Authority: An Exchange of Views, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 31, 38-42 (1997).
296. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
297. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Linda Greenhouse, Abortion Rights Strategy: All or Nothing,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1992, at Al.
298. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 177,181 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books, 1992).
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George Washington informed correspondents, "[t]he spirit of
accommodation was the basis of the present constitution." '299 During
constitutional debates over political economy and foreign policy,
Washington demanded of his bickering cabinet that there "be liberal
allowances, mutual forbearances, and temporising yieldings on all
sides.' '300 Failure to achieve constitutional compromises may result in
substantial harm to the body politic. During the nineteenth century
that damage was the most destructive civil war in world history.
Polarized politics is presently responsible for sharp reductions of
bipartisan cooperation in Congress, gridlock on crucial budgetary
issues, and a failure to staff adequately the federal judiciary.3 °1
Historically, the Supreme Court has proven the institution best
able to play a mediating role during times of polarized politics. While
sectional elections and an increased number of politically safe
election districts promote legislative extremism,3°2 the national
process for staffing the federal judiciary provides some counter
pressures toward moderation whenever the partisan balance in the
country is relatively even. 3 The same life tenure that constitutional
theorists proclaim enables Justices to decide on principles when
elected officials yield to interest °4 may also enable Justices to fashion
compromises that cannot be reached by elected officials whose
constituencies are too committed to a particular principle, whether
that principle concerns slavery or abortion. Given the present sour
political climate in the United States, preserving moderation on the
national institution least likely to abandon the political center may be
a valuable political task.
299. GEORGE WASHINGTON, GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION 540 (W.B.
Allen ed., 1988).
300. Id. at 578-79.
301. See SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
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